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Rereading the Preface to the 1993 paperback edition of David Armstrongʼs A Materialist 
Theory of the Mind (originally published in 1968) brings back vividly the personality of the 
author for those, who, like me, knew him. Armstrong had a strong feeling that he was an 
important part of the history of philosophy2; when he describes his theory in relation to 
those of other important figures like J.J. C. Smart and  U.T. Place, this reads like a 20th 
century account of the culmination of the development of the World Spirit (except that 
nothing is further from the authorʼs intention than declaring that the world is moved by a 
mind!). The book is indeed one of the finest expressions of a relentless materialist (or 
physicalist – Iʼll use these terms interchangeably) vision of the mind, and Armstrongʼs Causal 
theory of the mind has proved to be a powerful framework to explain various mental 
phenomena. But philosophers who accept some version of materialism still often think that 
their theory leaves something unexplained about the nature of conscious experiences. This 
contrasts with theories about physical phenomena, which are not considered to leave 
something unexplained in the same way. This phenomenon is known as the ʻexplanatory 
gapʼ.  
 In this paper, I revisit the issue of the explanatory gap. In section 2, I will recall a 
version of this idea from an influential paper which originated the very term: Joseph 
Levineʼs 1983 paper ‘Materialism and qualia: and the explanatory gapʼ. In sections 3 and 4, I 
will relate the issue to Armstrongʼs discussion of secondary qualities and bodily sensations, 
and to Locke’s idea that only the ideas of primary qualities resemble the quality that causes 
them. In section 5, I argue that the specific explanatory question Levine asks is this: ʻwhy 
this phenomenal character, rather than any other, is attached to this physiological 
process?ʼ. In section 6 and 7 I argue that this question can be answered. First, we should 
look for a fit not between the realizer of a role and the phenomenal character, but between 
 
1 Versions of this paper were presented at the Annual meeting of the Italian Society for 
Analytic Philosophy in Novara, and at the colloquium series at CEU. I am grateful to the 
audiences for pertinent questions; to Laszlo E. Szabo for advice, and to the editors, Peter 
Anstey and David-Braddon Mitchell for valuable comments on a draft. Special thanks to Tim 
Crane for many many discussions on the topic. 
2 If an anecdote is permitted here: in a conversation, Armstrong once expressed scepticism 
about the advantages of blind refereeing for journals. Someone objected: ʻBut David, if you 
submitted a paper to a journal and it contained a mistake, youʼd prefer if that mistake was 
identified by a referee, and the paper wasnʼt published just because you wrote it?ʼ 
Armstrong replied: ʻIf I make a mistake, it is an event of philosophical significance.ʼ This was 
of course largely a joke – but not entirely, I think. 
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the role itself and the character. Further, there is a natural fit between the phenomenal 
character of experiences and their functional roles: for example pains feel inherently 
unpleasant, and that explains why they cause avoidance behaviour. In section 8, I sketch a 
possible background theory that explains this fit, which I call Phenomenal Functionalism: a 
view that is meant to be similar to Phenomenal Intentionality, and holds that the functional 
role of an experience is grounded in its phenomenal features. In section 9, I discuss some 
other possible gaps in our understanding the relationship between the mental and the 
physical, and conclude that the fit between functional role and phenomenal character goes 
a long way, though probably not the whole way, to closing the explanatory gap. 
 
2. The explanatory gap 
As Armstrong explains in the Preface, the Causal theory, his own materialist account of the 
mind, has two steps. First, we give an analysis of mental features, based on the insight that 
a mental feature is apt to cause certain ranges of behaviour, and it is apt for being produced 
by certain ranges of stimuli. Second, we claim that what is apt for causing and being caused 
this way is a physical state of the brain. That physical state is then identified with the mental 
state (Armstrong 1968, xiv). These were originally regarded as contingent identities, but 
subsequently, Saul Kripke (1972) influentially argued that identity statements were 
necessary, even when empirically discoverable. Reflecting on this development, Armstrong 
notes that Kripkeʼs argument works only for rigid designators, whereas he intends the 
physical description of these states as non-rigid designators. Hence he thinks that Kripkeʼs 
argument against materialism fails (Armstrong 1968, xiv). 
 Kripkeʼs argument against materialism has indeed left many philosophers 
unconvinced, but a subsequent reflection on the identity statements in the focus of Kripkeʼs 
inquiry, by Joseph Levine, proved to be very influential. In this section, I will recall Levineʼs 
well-known argument for an ʻexplanatory gapʼ between the physical and mental description 
of certain phenomena. 
 Levine opens his paper (1983) by recalling Kripkeʼs argument against mental-physical 
identities, such as pain is C-fibre firing. Following Kripke (1972), Levine compares the 
following identity statements: 
 
(1) Pain is C-fibre firing. 
(2) Heat is the motion of molecules. 
 
As it is well known, Kripke argues that the first is false, the second is true. Levine has some 
doubts about Kripkeʼs argument; he thinks that the metaphysical thesis of the distinctness of 
mind and body is not conclusively proved by Kripke. However, he wants to make a different 
point in his paper. He claims that even if Kripke were wrong, and contrary to what he says, 
both statements were true, there would still be a significant difference between them. The 
difference is not metaphysical, but rather epistemic: it relates to the explanatory power of 
the statements. The second is fully explanatory, Levine claims, but the first leaves something 
crucial unexplained.  
 In setting up the problem, Levine considers a causal-functionalist account of heat and 
pain, which consists of the two steps of Armstrongʼs Causal theory, as sketched in the first 
paragraph of this section (though Levine doesnʼt particularly mention Armstrong). First, we 
identify the causal or functional role of pain and heat. Pain typically ʻwarns us of damage, it 
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causes us to attempt to avoid situations we believe will result in it, etcʼ (Levine 1983, 357) 
Heat is ʻresponsible for the expansion and contraction of mercury in thermometers, causes 
some gases to rise and others sink, etc.ʼ (Levine 1983, 357). Second, we look for the state 
that occupies this causal role and we identify these states with the original phenomena: itʼs 
the motion of molecules in the case of heat, and C-fibre firing in the case of pain. 
 According to Levine, the resulting statement (2), the identification of heat with the 
motion of molecule, expresses an identity that is fully explanatory. First, prior to the 
discovery of identity, the causal role of heat exhausts our notion of it: what we understand 
by the phenomenon of heat is fully accounted for by the causal role it plays. Second, 
knowledge of chemistry and physics makes it intelligible how the motion of molecules plays 
the causal role associated with heat. So once we identified the causal role, and discovered 
what plays this causal role, everything is explained. 
 The case of pain and C-fibre firing is different, Levine claims. What is similar is this. 
The causal role of pain is at least part of our concept of pain. And in the case of pain too, 
after we identify the causal role of pain, we discover a mechanism, C-fibre firing, that plays 
this causal role. But there is a crucial difference: our notion of pain is not exhausted by the 
causal role. The causal role is part of the notion, but there is more, namely, the phenomenal 
or qualitative character of pain. And while our knowledge of physiology makes it intelligible 
how C-fibre firing plays the causal role associated with pain, there is nothing in our 
knowledge of physiology that explains why C-fibre firing gives rise to the phenomenal 
properties of pain. As Levine puts it: ʻ… there seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which 
makes it naturally ‟fit” the phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some 
other set of phenomenal propertiesʼ (Levine 1983, 357). 
 According to Levine, the same story goes for example for the sensations of colours. 
Sensations of red and green can are apt to be caused by certain stimuli, which we may call 
physical red and physical green (first step). Now consider the receptors and physical 
processes that are responsible for responding to physical red and physical green, and call 
these physical stories R and G (second step). R is supposed to give rise to, or correlate with, 
the phenomenal feel of red experiences, and G the phenomenal feel of green experiences. 
But there is no explanation for this in R or G:  ʻR doesn’t really explain why I have one kind of 
qualitative experience … and not the otherʼ (Levine 1983, 358). Support for this claim is 
provided by imagining an inversion between the two qualitative characters, while the 
physical stories remain the same. The inversion seems perfectly conceivable, and this 
underlines the point that the phenomenal feel of red has no more intelligible connection to 
R than the phenomenal feel of green. 
 Talking of colour inversion may bring Lockeʼs name to mind, and indeed,  Levine says 
that the same point was captured by Locke who thought that ʻtwo sets of phenomena – 
corpuscular process and simple ideas – are stuck together in an arbitrary mannerʼ (Levine 
1983, p. 359). Levine is right to trace back this idea to Locke, and he may have also traced it 
further back to Descartes. Neither Descartes nor Locke supported an identity theory, but 
both dealt with the question of the relationship between the ideas of secondary (and 
tertiary) qualities, and the physical and physiological processes that precede or cause the 
formation of these ideas. Both Descartes and Locke claims that it is simply ordered by God 
which conscious experience goes with which physical process. Invoking Godʼs will in this way 
means, for both of them, that there is no intelligible explanation of the connection – that is, 




3. Secondary and tertiary qualities 
Levineʼs paper (1983) was published in the period between the first edition (1968) and the 
paperback edition (1993) of A Materialist Theory of the Mind, but it isnʼt included among 
the philosophical developments that Armstrong chose to reflect on in the Preface. Nor there 
is a mention of the explanatory gap in Armstrongʼs 1999 The Mind-Body Problem. However, 
it is instructive to recall Armstrongʼs discussion of secondary qualities and bodily sensations 
and compare it to the issue of the explanatory gap.  
 Both pain and colour sensations are analyzed by Armstrong as perceptual 
experiences (Chapters 12 and 14 of 1968), and are given a materialist account within his 
general materialist theory of perception as an acquisition of beliefs. The particular problems 
that need to be handled are the problems emerging from treating these experiences as 
perceptions.  
 In particular, if colour experiences are perceptions, then colours have to be analyzed 
as perceivable physical properties of physical objects. There are well-known objections to 
this view, but Armstrong thinks the objections can be overcome, and colours can be 
identified with micro-physical properties of objects. Bodily sensations are perceptions of 
various parts of the body. Pain, for example, is a perception of certain disturbances in the 
body, most probably of the stimulation of pain receptors. 
 The peculiarity of these experiences, according to Armstrong, is that they donʼt offer 
any clue about the nature of the physical or physiological properties that they are 
experiences of.  
 
...while we recognize by sight that all red things have something in common, sight 
does not inform us what that common property is. In the same way, we recognize by 
bodily perceptions that the class of felt disturbances called ʻbodily painsʼ all have 
something in common. But bodily perception does not inform us what that common 
feature is. (Armstrong 1968, 314) 
 
...we recognize by sight that red things differ among themselves in respect of 
redness. There are different shades of red. In the same way, certain pain resemble 
each other and differ from other pains. We recognize different sorts of pain. In the 
case of colours, however, we need not concede that vision informs us of the nature 
of the differences involved in being different shades of the same colour. In the same 
way, we need not concede that bodily perceptions inform us of the nature of the 
difference of bodily disturbance involved in the different sorts of pains. We are 
simply informed that the disturbances do differ in some respect. (Armstrong 1968, 
315) 
 
Perhaps this is the point where something like the explanatory gap appears in Armstrongʼs 
theory. The issue is not the same as the one discussed by Levine. Armstrongʼs remarks 
concern the relationship between the felt quality of the experience and the property thatʼs 
perceived in having that experience, while Levine is interested in the relationship between 
the experience and the realizing brain (or nervous system) state. Still, the issue is a certain 
lack of intelligible connection. Viewed from the side of the experiences, there is nothing that 
tells us about the nature of the physical property that is perceived in the experience. So 
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viewed from the other direction, the nature of the physical property will probably not 
explain why the experience feels the way it does. 
 Note the similarity between Armstrongʼs remarks and, again, Lockeʼs ideas on 
primary and secondary qualities. Locke thought that the ideas of primary qualities resemble 
those qualities that cause them; whereas the ideas attached to what we call ʻsecondary 
qualitiesʼ donʼt resemble their causes, because those causes are in fact combinations of 
primary qualities of insensible parts: 
 
… the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their 
patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by 
these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like 
our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves. (Locke 1690, Book II, Ch. VIII, 15) 
   
Ideas of sensations like pain, sometimes called ideas of ʻtertiary qualitiesʼ are treated by 
Locke in the same manner as ideas of secondary qualities. Tertiary qualities are bare powers 
of objects; that is, a combination of the primary qualities of insensible parts, that cause 
certain ideas in us, but again, the ideas donʼt resemble the causes. The difference between 
ideas of secondary and tertiary qualities is that in the latter case, we are not even tempted 
to think that their causes resemble them, while in the former case, we are so tempted. 
  
4. An idea can be like nothing but an idea 
As many have pointed out, the notion that ideas of primary qualities resemble the qualities 
that cause them is puzzling. Something has a circular shape if it takes up a certain space 
within a boundary whose points are equidistant from a central point. How could an idea 
resemble this, when ideas are either immaterial – as Locke thought – or realized in a brain 
state that is certainly not circular itself? As Berkeley aptly remarked, ʻan idea can be like 
nothing but an ideaʼ. Ideas of primary qualities will no more resemble the qualities that 
cause them than ideas of secondary qualities. 
 The suggestion that ideas could represent things in the world by resembling them is 
certainly discredited in contemporary theorizing about representations, and yet the Lockean 
idea survives in various forms. One, it seems to me, is Armstrongʼs view above: when we 
recognize that all red things have something in common, the idea does not inform us of the 
nature of the shared property – that is, that itʼs some microphysical property of surfaces.  
 The situation is supposed to be different for primary qualities. But is it? Lockeʼs list of 
primary qualities is solidity, extension, figure (shape), motion or rest, and number. Consider 
the primary qualities involved in my current experience. I see one stationary coffee cup on 
the table, with a continuous smooth surface and a cylindrical shape. As a matter of fact, 
these qualities are realized by a combination of the primary qualities of insensible particles: 
a structure of not one, but many particles, with space between them, and these particles 
may move while the cup is stationary. Where is the resemblance? And we could hardly 
discover the microphysical realization of these perceivable properties just from the ideas of 
the properties (perceived shape, size and motion) themselves. So primary qualities seem to 
have the same status in this respect as secondary qualities. The point, as it is sometimes 
remarked, is the difference between the manifest and the scientific image, rather than 
between primary and secondary qualities. 
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 Interestingly, elsewhere Armstrong acknowledges what seems to me a similar point. 
He introduces the topic of secondary qualities with the well-known observation that the 
scientific image of the world, at least since Galileo, provides no place for the secondary 
qualities, since physical theories do not attribute such qualities to the fundamental 
constituents to the physical world (like particles or fields). He adds that some philosophers 
hold that therefore secondary qualities must qualify the mind, rather than the physical 
world. Armstrong responds by endorsing an objection made by Berkeley: in a visual 
experience, he says, for example colour and visible extension ʻare inextricably bound up with 
each otherʼ (Armstrong 1968, 272). So if we relegate colour to the mind, we should do the 
same with visible extension.  
 All these points seem to be manifestations of the same underlying issue. Our 
awareness of primary qualities in perceptual experiences surely contributes to the 
phenomenal character of these experiences alongside with our awareness of secondary and 
tertiary qualities. Insofar as these are all ideas, that is, (properties of) experiences, they have 
the same ontological status. And even if they are all material, none of them will ʻresembleʼ 
their extra-experiential causes more than any other: a perception of a blue circle will be no 
more circular than it is blue. Further, neither of them will inform us, just by the way they 
appear in our awareness, about their microphysical realization. 
 When Locke says that for secondary qualities, God assigned simple ideas to 
corpuscular processes, but could have chosen to assign different ones, he is motivated by 
the thought that the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble their causes. One of the 
places that Levine references in Lockeʼs Essay (Book II, Ch. VIII, sec. 13) explicitly mentions 
the lack of ʻsimilitudeʼ between these ideas and the movement of insensible particles 
affecting our senses which cause these ideas. Although Levine says that Locke captures the 
same point that he (that is, Levine) is trying to make, surely he doesnʼt mean the view that 
only primary qualities resemble their causes. So we should see if Levine is more successful 
than Locke and Armstrong in drawing a contrast between primary and secondary qualities 
along these lines. 
 
5. Why this rather than that? 
We have seen in section 2 that Levine thinks that there is an explanatory gap between the 
felt quality of experiences and their physical realization. In this section, I will look more 
closely at the precise nature of the missing explanation. 
 The unanswered question that is identified by both Locke and Levine has this form: 
ʻWhy this, rather than any other?ʼ What is missing, according to both of them, is the 
contrastive explanation of why this phenomenal character rather than any other is identical 
to, or produced by, a certain physiological process. That Levine is missing this contrastive 
explanation is clear from his formulations of the problem that I quoted above: 
 
… there seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally “fit” the 
phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some other set of 
phenomenal properties. (Levine 1983, 357, emphasis added) 
 
R doesn’t really explain why I have one kind of qualitative experience … and not the 




The same thought is present in Levineʼs reference to Locke, and the suggestion that 
corpuscular processes and ideas are stuck together in an arbitrary manner:  
 
The simple ideas go with their respective corpuscular configurations because God 
chose to so attach them. He could have chosen differently. (Levine 1983, 359, 
emphasis added) 
 
In other, words, there is no explanation that would make it intelligible for us why God 
attached this, rather than another idea to the physical process. The lack of such contrastive 
explanation, at least on the face of it, suggests that phenomenal characters and 
physiological processes are wholly different kinds of existents. They donʼt fit into the same 
order of beings, but instead they exist side-by-side. 
 This, according to Levine and many other commentators, is merely suggestive at this 
point. One way to pursue the matter is to develop the argument for the explanatory gap into 
an argument for an ontological gap. This is the anti-physicalist route. 
 One alternative is a certain type of physicalist views, which acknowledges that there 
is an explanatory gap, but resists the further development, for example by criticizing the 
anti-physicalistʼs positive argument. Some of these physicalists felt that they still owe an 
account of why there is an explanatory gap, since the gap seems to point towards 
distinctness where no real distinctness exists (Papineau 2002).  
 In what follows, I would like to pursue a strategy thatʼs different from both the above 
physicalist and anti-physicalist strategy. I want to suggest that contrary to what Levine and 
Locke say, in many cases, there is a contrastive explanation, and the gap can be closed, or it 
is at least not as wide as it first appears. The explanation is provided in the framework of the 
Causal theory of the mind. This, in itself, is not a supporting positive argument for 
physicalism. Just as asserting the explanatory gap does not amount to the assertion of 
ontological distinctness, denying the explanatory gap does not amount to denying 
ontological distinctness. 
 The ʻwhy this rather than thatʼ is a particular version of an explanatory demand, and 
there are other possible explanatory demands. For example, we could ask: why anything, 
rather than nothing? That is, why do some physiological processes constitute, or give rise to 
conscious experiences at all? Another possible question: why this, rather than something 
slightly different? Why does this physiological process give rise to a sensation of precisely 
this shade of phenomenal red, rather than of a somewhat darker shade?   
 The focus of this paper is the first kind of question. I believe this is the question asked 
in Levineʼs paper, as the emphasis in the quotes above show. The original statement of the 
explanatory gap was a plea for a missing ʻwhy this, rather than thatʼ explanation, and this is 
the explanation I aim to give. As I will clarify below, my strategy may not suitable for 
satisfying the other two explanatory demands. What is achieved by my argument, if these 
other questions are left unexplained? In the last section, I will return to this question and try 
to answer what will have been achieved by then. Here I simply ask the reader to keep in 
mind that I am deliberately targeting the first type of question, and not the second two. 
 
6. The contingency of the realizer 
Levine claims that we donʼt have an intelligible explanation of why the qualitative feel of 
pain, rather than another phenomenal property, goes together with C-fibre firing. In 
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contrast, I would like to argue that we do have such an explanation. The explanation is based 
on two crucial ideas: the first is the Causal theory of the mind, and the second is a thesis 
about the natural fit between the phenomenal character of experiences and their functional 
roles. This section expounds the first part, the next two sections the second. 
 The first step of the Causal theory, as we have seen, is to identify the causal (or 
functional) role of a mental phenomena. Pain is normally caused by some damage to the 
body, and it normally causes avoidance behaviour.  Of course, the actual causal role of pain 
is much more complex, and is relative to other mental states, but these can be included in 
the analysis. 
 Once we identified the functional role of an experience, we will look for the 
mechanism or process that plays this functional role in human beings. Here philosophers 
tend to behave with a certain amount of nonchalance about the empirical details, assuming 
that scientists will identify some or other process. Kripke himself admits that he knows 
virtually nothing about C-fibres, except that their stimulation is said to correlate with pain 
(Kripke 1972, 149). One thing we cannot take for granted is that there will be a single 
mechanism or process type. For example, it seems very likely that pain has a sensory and an 
affective component, and these can be dissociated through selective damage (Grahek 2011). 
Even the sensory component is likely to be realized by more than one type of process. Iʼm 
going to appeal to the same device as Levine does when he calls the ʻphysical storyʼ of 
seeing red ʻRʼ: I am going to call the ʻphysical storyʼ for pain ʻC-fibre firingʼ, and note that this 
story may turn out to be quite complex. 
The connection between C-fibre firing and the causal role of pain involves some 
contingency, in two directions. First there is the widely accepted thesis of multiple 
realizability, meaning that processes other than C-fibre firing could play the pain-role. The 
connection is not entirely arbitrary: itʼs not true that just any physical or physiological 
process could do the job. But there is almost certainly a lack of necessary connection. The 
other direction of contingency concerns the functions that C-fibres could play. Plausibly, they 
could play roles other than the pain-role – again, not just any roles, but probably more than 
one. This is not news: most philosophers accept that the connection between the role and 
realizer of mental functions is, to some extent, contingent. 
Levine himself is of course aware of this: at the beginning of the paper, he mentions 
the functionalist proposal that ʻthe intuition that pain could exist without C-fibers is 
explained in terms of the multiple realizability of mental statesʼ (Levine 1983, 355). Since he 
thinks the functionalist will have other problems, he abandons this explanation. This, I 
believe is a mistake; what is partly (only partly, but still) responsible for the appearance of an 
explanatory gap for ʻPain is C-fibre firingʼ is an attempt to connect directly the realizer of the 
role with the phenomenal property 
When Levine asks what it is about C-fibre firing that fits the phenomenal properties 
of pain, the functional role momentarily drops out of the picture. The direct connection 
between C-fibre firing and pain would be difficult to establish. Levine says that the lack of 
intelligible connection between C-fibre firing and pain explains why in some other 
arguments, philosophers rely on the possibility of imagining one without the other. 
Continuing the presentation of Lockeʼs view that the ideas and corpuscular processes are 




so long as the two states of affairs seem arbitrarily stuck together this way, 
imagination will pry them apart. Thus it is the non-intelligibility of the connection 
between the feeling of pain and its physical correlate that underlies the apparent 
contingency of that connection. (Levine 1983, 359) 
 
But this diagnosis can be questioned. I propose to return to the familiar functionalist point: 
that the ʻapparent contingencyʼ is a consequence of the contingent connection between C-
fibre firing and the pain-role. Even if there was some intelligible connection between the 
feeling of pain and the pain-role (as it is proposed in the next section), the realizer would still 
occupy this role contingently. This is the first step in closing or narrowing the explanatory 
gap.  
 . 
7. The natural fit between qualitative character and functional role 
The first part in narrowing the explanatory gap was to identify the functional role of an 
experience and look for the physical process that plays this role. The second part is to point 
out that there is a natural fit between the phenomenal character and the functional role of 
conscious experiences. 
 If we follow Levine, the explanatory gap opens when we ask why C-fibre firing is 
identical to (or gives rise to, or correlated with) pain, rather than with the experience of 
pleasure, or the experience of smelling gasoline. As we saw in the previous section, this isnʼt 
really the question we should be asking. The important question is rather this: why does an 
experience with the phenomenal character of pain (rather than with the character of feeling 
pleasure, or the character of smelling gasoline) play the pain-role? Levine claims that we 
have no intelligible explanation for this either. I think he is wrong: the answer is that the 
phenomenal character of pain is eminently suitable for an experience that plays this 
functional role.  
 First, pain is inherently unpleasant. This is part of the phenomenal character of pain. 
That pain is unpleasant makes it no surprise that it causes avoidance behaviour. Other things 
being equal, we prefer not having unpleasant experiences, so we try to avoid them or stop 
them once we have them. (If pain has a distinct sensory and affective component, then 
unpleasantness is part of the affective component. And thatʼs precisely the component that 
seems to give rise to avoidance behaviour; see Grahek 2011).  Second, it is good to try to 
avoid or stop pain because pain alerts us to a damage in the body and – other things being 
equal – we would like to avoid or stop damage to the body. So it is a good idea that damage 
in the body causes this unpleasant experience which, in turn, causes avoidance. Third, 
physical pains normally have a felt location in the body. The felt location is part of the 
phenomenal character of the experience, and it directs the agent towards the possibly 
damaged bodily part. Fourth, by and large, more serious damage causes more intense pain, 
which is again part of the phenomenal character of pain.     
 Hence far from being arbitrary, it was in fact a very wise decision by God to choose 
the unpleasant experience of pain which is felt in a certain part of the body to accompany 
the state that is caused by damage in that part of the body, and causes avoidance behaviour.   
 If God is all powerful, maybe he could have associated the experience of pleasure or 
of smelling gasoline with the functional role of pain, but it is really hard to see how that 
would have worked for us. First, itʼs hard to see how the experience of smelling gasoline 
could play the role of alerting to damages in various parts of our body. Smells donʼt have a 
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felt location in the way pains do. Perhaps it could be suggested that we could have different 
smells associated with damage in different parts of the body. That means the smell of 
gasoline alone is already disqualified, since it doesnʼt have the complexity that pain 
sensations do. To inform us of damage of the many different parts of the body, we would 
need a lot of different smells. Integration would be a problem. We are not very good in 
distinguishing different parts of a complex smell; if we fell and hurt our knee and hand, and 
we would have the sensations of the smell of onion and of burnt toast (supposing these are 
the simple ideas arbitrarily associated with damage in the knee and hand) itʼs not clear that 
we could discern the elements of the complex resulting sensation. They would also have to 
be integrated with sensations of pressure and the sensation of temperature. The whole 
enterprise seems rather hopeless.   
 As for pleasure: what we are to imagine is that pleasant feelings would cause 
immediate distress and avoidance behaviour. Now, it is possible to imagine that a person 
exhibits such reactions: suppose someone is deeply convinced that feeling any kind of 
pleasure is a mortal sin. For such a person, feeling pleasure could cause immediate distress. 
But note that this isnʼt a scenario where pleasure occupies the functional role of pain: 
rather, this explanation simply makes the story intelligible to us relative to our experience of 
pleasure, with its ordinary functional role. We noted above the familiar point that functional 
roles are always relative to other mental states, and this is just another instance of that 
point. 
 But what about the other case Levine mentions, that of red and green?  Levine here 
relies on the familiar idea that red and green sensations could be inverted. Surely, here God 
could have chosen to attach either of the two ideas with the physical story R. In response, 
note that the case of red and green are very special. It is simply not true that you could 
invoke any other pairs of phenomenal properties and easily imagine an inversion, while 
retaining functional equivalence. For example, a pain-pleasure inversion, or a pain and 
experience-of-smelling-gasoline inversion are not plausible at all. 
 One reason inversion is not plausible in these cases, as mentioned above, is that 
different affective elements – unpleasant, pleasant, neutral – are associated with each 
experience, and these are plausibly responsible for different effects the experience has on 
our behaviour. The other reason why many inversions are not plausible is that phenomenal 
properties are part of a quality-space, with certain structural features (Clark 1993). Pains 
vary in intensity, in felt location, and in qualities such as throbbing, dull-aching, burning, or 
stabbing. These are all phenomenal features, and they are responsible for the felt similarities 
and differences among episodes of pain experiences. The structure of the quality space 
shows a natural fit with the typical causes of the experience, and it is reflected in our 
discriminatory behaviour in responding to these causes. (The concept is presented in much 
more detail in David Rosenthalʼs contribution to this volume.)  
 The structure of the pain quality space is quite different from the structure of the 
odour quality space, which in turn is different from the structure of the colour quality space 
and the sound quality space. So itʼs hard to see how we could replace a quality by a 
completely different one while keeping the same structure of causes and the same range of 
behavioural manifestations. In fact, it was suggested that not even the red-green inversion is 
made possible by the phenomenal structure of colours, and that this has relevance for the 




8. Phenomenal Functionalism 
The homomorphism between quality spaces and physical causes, and the fact that quality 
spaces are reflected in discriminatory behaviour, suggested to some that we could offer a 
reductive theory of phenomenal qualities. David Rosenthal, in his contribution to this 
volume, presents exactly this proposal (see also Clark 1993and Rosenthal 2005). But we 
need not assume such a reductive view to make use of the explanatory potential of these 
homomorphisms.  I will sketch a different background theory that goes well with the insight 
about the natural fit between phenomenal characters and functional roles. (Space doesnʼt 
permit me to defend this view here in detail, so I will restrict myself to its presentation.) 
 I propose a view which may be called Phenomenal Functionalism. It is meant to be 
parallel to the Phenomenal Intentionality proposal (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Loar 2003), 
on which the intentional features of conscious experiences are grounded in their 
phenomenal character. Similarly, I put forward that (some of) the functional features of 
conscious experiences are grounded in their phenomenal character.  We try to avoid 
unpleasant experiences and seek out pleasant ones. Phenomenal qualities are located in 
quality spaces, and this makes them suitable to be responses to a homomorphic structure of 
causes which characterizes a certain portion of reality. The structure of these spaces is quite 
different for different kinds of qualities (for example, in different perceptual modalities), 
hence the functional roles of experiences – their typical causes, and the discriminatory 
consequences in behaviour – will be quite different. For these reasons, seamless inversions 
of qualities while we keep functional or physical states the same are very rare. 
 In addition to bodily sensations, phenomenal functionalism works well for occurrent 
moods like anxiety or elation. Anxiety is characterized by a characteristic behaviour: for 
example the inability to concentrate, the tendency to get irritated, to jump on unexpected 
stimuli, and so on. These reactions are different from the characteristic behavioural patterns 
accompanying for example carefree contentment (Crane 1998). And the way these moods 
feel seems to be intrinsically connected to these roles: as in the case of pain and pleasure, 
itʼs difficult to imagine an inversion of the feeling of anxiety and contentment. 
 The qualitative feel of experiences is often characterized as something thatʼs left 
once we extract their intentional and functional features. Tim Crane calls this the ʻresidue 
conceptionʼ of consciousness (Crane 2018). Levine seems to be suggesting something along 
these lines. After he acknowledges that the causal role of pain is a crucial part of our 
concept of pain, he says that ʻthere is more to our concept of pain than its causal role, there 
is its qualitative character, how it feels; and what is left unexplained by the discovery of C-
fibre firing is why pain should feel the way it does!ʼ (Levine 1983, 357, emphasis in the 
original).  
 The idea that the qualitative feel is ʻmoreʼ than the causal role can be interpreted in 
different ways. It could mean that the qualitative feel is not reducible to the functional role, 
and in this sense, I am in agreement. But it could also mean that the phenomenal character 
is completely independent of the functional role – that once the functional role is fixed, any 
kind of feeling could be added. As I explained above, I find this kind of independence very 
implausible, but this is exactly what seems to be suggested by Levine when he talks about 
the explanatory gap. 
 The Phenomenal Intentionality program was born out of a dissatisfaction between 
the sharp separation between the phenomenal and the intentional features of conscious 
experiences. In opposition to this separation, defenders of the program suggest that the 
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intentionality of mental states is inextricably linked to their phenomenal character. 
Phenomenal Functionalism would be a similar protest against the divide between the 
phenomenal and functional features, and an affirmation of their deep connection.  
 The Phenomenal Intentionality program is one way of opposing the sharp separation 
between phenomenal and intentional features. Another is representationalism, a view that 
also sees a strong connection between the two, but reverses their order of priority. Instead 
of holding that intentional features are constituted by phenomenal features, it asserts the 
supervenience of the phenomenal on the representational. Phenomenal Functionalism also 
has such a counterpart: good old functionalism. This form of functionalism would not try to 
eliminate phenomenal features, but would also deny the residue conception of 
consciousness.  
 Both functionalism and Phenomenal Functionalism immediately entail that there is a 
natural fit between the phenomenal features of an experience and its functional role. Hence 
they are good background theories for the explanatory task carried out in section 6. 
 My sympathies lie with Phenomenal Functionalism, and someone may ask how this 
background theory fits into the overall project of closing the explanatory gap. Though as far 
as I can see, Phenomenal Functionalism, at least as characterized so far, is neutral on the 
issue of physicalism, it is most plausibly seen as opposed to a reductive view of phenomenal 
features (just like the Phenomenal Intentionality program). One may ask whether this aspect 
would render its services useless in the current project. The thought is that closing the gap is 
a project for physicalists. A view that posits phenomenal features as basic in the explanatory 
theory will hardly serve this purpose.  
 On the picture suggested by Levine, by Locke, by the residue conception of 
consciousness, by the epiphenomenal qualia view, there is absolutely no intelligible 
connection between the functional and phenomenal features of experiences. These two 
aspects of reality exist side-by-side. Even if the explanatory gap is not in itself an argument 
for anti-physicalism, its existence is meant to be a concern for physicalists. Consequently, we 
may expect that anti-physicalists would cheerfully acknowledge the existence of the gap. Iʼve 
been arguing in this paper that this would be wrong, on independent grounds: whether 
physicalism is correct or not, the sharp separation of the phenomenal and the functional is 
simply implausible. Our experiences fit very well into the physical world and our place in it. 
Instead of arbitrarily assigning simple ideas to physical processes, God, in his wisdom, 
assigned phenomenal characters to experiences that are eminently suitable for playing 
certain functional roles. 
 
9. Various gaps 
Conscious experiences have a phenomenal character, and this character has a natural fit 
with the functional role of the experience. Hence the explanatory demand ʻwhy this, rather 
than that?ʼ, posed by Levine, can be satisfied. C-fibre firing correlates with the experience of 
pain, rather than, say, pleasure, because in human beings, C-fibre firing occupies the 
functional role of pain, and the phenomenal character of pain naturally fits this functional 
role (much better than it would fit the functional role of pleasure). 
 Thus we can answer the ʻwhy this, rather than thatʼ question. Where does this leave 
us with the other possible explanatory questions we identified in section 4? Let us first 
consider the question ʻwhy this, rather than something slightly different?ʼ I am not sure 
what to say about this case. If we identify the functional role of experiences on the basis of a 
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common-sense analysis, then it seems that there is no answer to this question. Yes, the 
unpleasantness of pain is suitable for causing avoidance behaviour, but a slightly more or 
less intense pain would also seem suitable to cause the same. Yes, these causes and this 
discriminatory behaviour perfectly fit the inner similarity relations among the sensations of 
shades of red, but if all shades felt a touch darker, the fit would seem to be the same. This 
would suggest that the strategy pursued here cannot answer this explanatory question.  
 However, what makes me hesitant is the prospect of a scientific inquiry for example 
into quality spaces and their corresponding causes that would reveal subtle differences 
undetected by common-sense analysis. Something like this happened in the case of red-
green inversion: common sense seems to license the possibility of such an inversion,  but it 
has been argued that a more subtle investigation of the colour quality space shows that a 
perfect functional equivalent is not possible (eg. Hardin 1987). Maybe more subtle 
investigations would also exclude the possibility of shifts. 
 Can we answer the ʻwhy anything, rather than nothingʼ question – in other words, 
can we explain why some physiological processes give rise to conscious experiences at all?  
According to the line of thought presented in this paper, once we have the functional role of 
states or events on one side, and the phenomenal characters on the other, we can pair them 
according to the natural fit between character and role. But the same strategy does not 
explain why there were phenomenal characters in the first place. Some of our bodily 
functions seem to work perfectly well without the involvement of consciousness. For 
example, arguably, processes that occur in the dorsal visual stream, which takes visual 
stimuli as input and issues motor commands as an output, do not give rise to consciousness 
(Goodale and Milner 1992). In contrast, processes in the ventral stream do give rise to 
consciousness. The strategy pursued here does not explain why.  
  In fact, this challenge can also be divided to further, more specific tasks. One is to 
give an account of the general function of consciousness (for example having to do with 
combining information from several sources), and try to answer questions like the one 
above. When certain interactions with the world fell in the category of requiring 
consciousness, we could detect this from their functional role. This theory would assign a 
uniform account for all conscious processes. 
 There is a different task that Mary, the scientist in the black and white room faces 
(Jackson 1982, Howard Robinson 1982 has a similar example with a deaf scientist). Let us 
first consider a modified Mary story, where Mary lives in a normal world and is accorded the 
full range of experiences, but her studies are curiously detached from her experiences. She 
studies in detail the physics and physiology of sensations, perceptions, and emotions, but 
she is not told which of her experiences are connected to which physiological process. For 
example, she studies ʻC-fibresʼ (or whatever complex physiological process which underlies 
pain), but is never told that this process in fact underlies pain.  According to the argument 
pursued in this paper, after a while, she would be able to make the connection herself.  
 Original Mary is in a less favourable position. Her task is not to pair experiences with 
physical processes, but rather to somehow deduce the nature of the experience from the 
physical process, without any further help. The consensus is that she wonʼt be able to do 
that. She may be able to form some idea: she will know itʼs a colour experience, itʼs not an 
emotion or a bodily sensation, and since she has had those, she will have some reasonable 
expectations of the phenomenal character of experience. But she wonʼt know it exactly. 
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 One immediate consequence is that if there is an epistemic gap between the physical 
and the phenomenal, it will be the kind of gap that we find in original Maryʼs understanding. 
Indeed, Levine himself, in his book Purple Haze (2001), shifts focus to the absent qualia 
argument and the knowledge argument from the kind of explanatory question that he 
considers in the original paper. Note, however, that Mary’s predicament is not very naturally 
characterized as lacking some explanation. Explanations are usually answers to ‘why’ 
questions; they have an explicandum: a fact, or an event. Mary’s task is to deduce the 
character of the experience from its physical description. It doesn’t look like she is trying to 
answer a why-question, or that there is a fact or event that she is trying to explain. In 
contrast, in Levineʼs 1983 paper, there was a clear why-question waiting for an answer: why 
this, rather than that? There is also the other general explanatory question – why are some 
processes conscious? – but that is not the question Mary is trying to answer either. 
 So while Mary has a gap in her understanding or knowledge, I would be reluctant to 
call it an ʻexplanatory gapʼ. In any case, no matter what we call it, the question is whether 
this gap threatens our understanding of the mind. The answer will partly depend on our 
assessment of what is achieved by explanations about physical phenomena.  
 For example, do we have an explanation of why the fundamental constituents of the 
universe are what they are? Couldnʼt we have a world with a slightly different assortment of 
elementary particles? It is arguable that certain natural constants that determine the 
strength of interactions, have, according to our best theories, taken spontaneous values 
during the evolution of the universe, and could have had other values within a certain range. 
And many of these facts affect the world of the elementary parts. Perhaps itʼs just a fact that 
about our world that it contains certain basic ingredients. Similarly, we could argue that it is 
a fact about our world that it contains certain conscious experiences.  
 If this is right, then answering Levineʼs question, ʻwhy this, rather than another?ʼ 
actually goes a long way to close or narrow the explanatory gap. We have a world where 
certain beings have conscious experiences with phenomenal characters. These phenomenal 
characters donʼt belong to a realm that it entirely disconnected from the physical realm: in 
fact, there is a natural fit between the two kinds of features. There isnʼt a huge gap between 
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